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Neuroeconomic Studies of Impulsivity: Now or Just as Soon as Possible?
Abstract
Existing behavioral studies of intertemporal choice suggest that both human and animal choosers are
impulsive. One possible explanation for this is that they discount future gains in a hyperbolic or quasi-
hyperbolic fashion (David I. Laibson 1997; Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein, and Ted O’Donoghue
2002). This observation stands in contrast to standard normative theory, which predicts exponential
discounting for any single maximizing agent (Robert H. Strotz 1956). This disparity between empirical and
normative approaches is typically explained by proposing that human choosers suffer from inner conflict,
balancing an impulse for an immediate gratification against other forces calling for delayed gratification
(Richard H. Thaler and H. M. Shefrin 1981; Laibson 1997; Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine 2006; Jess
Benhabib and Alberto Bisin 2005; B. Douglas Bernheim and Antonio Rangel 2004; Faruk Gul and Wolfgang
Pesendorfer 2001). We hoped to better understand both the behavioral and algorithmic roots of this
phenomenon by conducting a series of behavioral and neurobiological experiments on intertemporal choice.
The results of our behavioral experiments deviate significantly from the predictions of both normative and
inner conflict models. The results of our neurobiological experiments provide new algorithmic insights into
the mechanisms of intertemporal choice.
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Existing behavioral studies of intertemporal 
choice suggest that both human and animal 
choosers are impulsive. One possible explana-
tion for this is that they discount future gains in a 
hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic fashion (David I. 
Laibson 1997; Shane Frederick, George Loewen-
stein, and Ted O’Donoghue 2002). This obser-
vation stands in contrast to standard normative 
theory, which predicts exponential discounting 
for any single maximizing agent (Robert H. 
Strotz 1956). This disparity between empirical 
and normative approaches is typically explained 
by proposing that human choosers suffer from 
inner conflict, balancing an impulse for an imme-
diate gratification against other forces calling for 
delayed gratification (Richard H. Thaler and H. 
M. Shefrin 1981; Laibson 1997; Drew Fudenberg 
and David K. Levine 2006; Jess Benhabib and 
Alberto Bisin 2005; B. Douglas Bernheim and 
Antonio Rangel 2004; Faruk Gul and Wolfgang 
Pesendorfer 2001). We hoped to better under-
stand both the behavioral and algorithmic roots 
of this phenomenon by conducting a series of 
behavioral and neurobiological experiments on 
intertemporal choice. The results of our behav-
ioral experiments deviate significantly from the 
predictions of both normative and inner conflict 
models. The results of our neurobiological exper-
iments provide new algorithmic insights into the 
mechanisms of intertemporal choice.
Decision Theory: new MeThoDs, new insighTs
Neuroeconomic Studies of Impulsivity:  
Now or Just as Soon as Possible?
By Paul William Glimcher, Joseph Kable, and Kenway Louie*
I.  Experiment One
We measured the preferences of 10 human 
subjects using a set of 576–720 binary choices 
that presented options differing in both delay 
and value. From these measurements, we esti-
mated an indifference curve for each subject. 
This indifference curve, which can be mod-
eled as the product of underlying utility and 
discount functions, was hyperbolic, as has been 
previously described (Leonard Green and Joel 
Meyerson 2004; Kris N. Kirby and Nino N. 
Marakovic 1995).
During a series of one-hour behavioral ses-
sions, subjects were asked to make 144 inter-
temporal choices. Each round presented a choice 
between a certain immediate gain of $20 and a 
larger gain at a delay varying from 6 hours to 6 
months (for example 1, 10, 21, 50, 90, and 180 
days). Subjects were informed that the first ses-
sion was unpaid. After completing three behav-
ioral sessions (two of which were paid) and 
having used the debit cards described below to 
receive at least one delayed payment, the sub-
jects completed one or two additional choice 
sessions, this time inside a brain scanner.
Across sessions, the exact values and delays 
presented in the choice set were varied by small 
amounts. At the conclusion of the second ses-
sion (and each subsequent session), four choices 
were randomly selected from the set of choices 
made during that session, and the subjects were 
paid for those decisions. All payments were 
made through a commercial debit card system 
that allowed us to load the precise amount of the 
selected option at the precise time specified by 
the subject’s choice. Subjects were reminded by 
e-mail at the time each payment was delivered 
into their debit accounts. The debit cards we 
employed are nationally accepted as credit cards 
at millions of locations throughout the United 
States. Subjects were thus free to consume their 
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gains with negligible transaction costs. As a fur-
ther benefit, the cards allowed us to monitor the 
actual consumption behavior of our subjects.
The behavioral data gathered in this way 
allowed us to identify, for each of the six delays 
we examined, the amount of money for which 
each subject was statistically indifferent, with 
$20 paid immediately. We then fit, to these six 
stochastic indifference points, both hyperbolic 
and exponential functions. These functions were 
equivalent to a representation of the discounted 
utilities that could be used to predict the sto-
chastic pattern of choice made by each of our 
subjects. We found, as in previous studies, the 
behavior of our subjects was better described 
by hyperbolic rather than by exponential func-
tions (Laibson 1997), implying that our subjects 
employed a hyperbolic-like discount function. 
We also found our subjects varied significantly 
in the rates of discounting implied by this mea-
sured function. Our most patient subject and our 
most impulsive subject differed by more than an 
order of magnitude in the hyperbolic constants 
that characterized their indifference curves.
These individually measured indifference 
curves permitted us, for each subject, to model 
the discounted utility of each delayed option 
presented to our subjects in the brain scanner. 
With this behavioral measurement in hand, 
we could then ask whether any activity in the 
brain of these subjects was correlated with the 
discounted utility of an option under consider-
ation. We found that, in each of our subjects, 
the activity of the brain in three areas typically 
associated with option valuation (Allison N. 
McCoy et al. 2003; Howard C. Cromwell and 
Wolfram Schultz 2003; Hans C. Breiter et al. 
2001; Nathaniel D. Daw et al. 2006; Samuel M. 
McClure, Michele K. York, and P. Read 
Montague 2004; John P. O’Doherty 2004) 
showed a clear correlation with this behaviorally 
derived function. Put another way, brain activity 
measured in the medial prefrontal cortex, the 
ventral striatum, and the posterior cingulate cor-
tex had many of the properties of that subject’s 
discounted utility function. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, we saw no evidence in any of these areas 
of neural functions that were better correlated 
with functions that were either steeper or shal-
lower (in exponential or hyperbolic terms) than 
the behaviorally measured discounted utility 
function for that subject. More unambiguously, 
we also saw no evidence that activity in any of 
these areas showed different discount rates. We 
saw no evidence of separable neural agents that 
could account for the multiple selves that are used 
to explain hyperbolic-like discounting behavior. 
This finding argues strongly against the hypoth-
esis that multiple selves, with different discount 
functions, are instantiated as discrete neural 
systems at the proximal algorithmic level.
This finding contradicts an earlier report 
(McClure et al. 2004) which appeared to sup-
port the dual-self b−d model of Laibson (1997), 
at a neurobiological level. In that report, subjects 
were asked to make ~40 choices between gains 
available at three delays. Although that study 
did not examine the choices made by subjects, 
the authors reported that they observed higher 
brain activity for immediate option sets in these 
same three areas. From this enhanced neural 
response for immediate options, the authors con-
cluded that these brain areas were an “impetu-
ous” agent of the type that would be predicted 
for the b component of the b−d model. We note, 
however, that an area where activity was linearly 
correlated with a hyperbolic-like discounted 
utility function of any kind (which necessar-
ily favors immediate over delayed gains) would 
also show this property. The critical test of the 
multiple-selves model at a neural level, which 
these authors did not perform, would be to show 
that the area in question discounted faster than 
behavioral measurements of the subjects’ indif-
ference curves or, at least, that different brain 
areas discounted at different rates. We show that 
this is not the case.
Our subjects showed hyperbolic-like indif-
ference curves that could be characterized 
as discounted utility functions. The areas of 
their brains known to participate in option 
 valuation showed surprisingly similar functions. 
Although the hyperbolic or exponential coeffi-
cients that described the steepness of these neu-
ral and behavioral functions varied widely from 
 subject to subject, the behaviorally and neurally 
measured functions made on a single subject 
appeared to be tightly, and surprisingly linearly, 
correlated.
II.  Experiment Two
Why do choosers discount hyperbolically? 
The standard explanation is that this is the result 
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of inner conflict between forces favoring impa-
tience and those favoring patience. Our neuro-
biological measurements, however, showed no 
evidence that these forces reside as physical 
processes within the human brain. This sig-
nificant discontinuity between the behavioral 
models and the neural structures that actually 
produce behavior led us to reexamine the behav-
ioral phenomenon of hyperbolic discounting. If 
internal divisions do not account for intertempo-
ral choice behavior, then perhaps intertemporal 
preferences are more complicated than previ-
ously has been supposed. In a second experi-
ment, we set out to test the hypothesis that the 
discounted utilities of all prizes, in all choice 
sets, can be described as functions of the inter-
val between the immediate present and the time 
of option delivery, as is widely assumed.
We repeated experiment one with a new group 
of subjects, but this time randomly intermixed 
two sets of choices. The first set of choices was 
identical to that employed in experiment one 
(the immediate-option set), while the second 
set used either the same values as choice set 
one or a set of higher values, with an additional 
60-day front-end delay added to all options (the 
delayed-option set). Thus, the earliest possible 
option, which appeared in all of the choices in 
the second set, was a gain of $20 at a delay of 60 
days, or a gain of $30–$60 at a delay of 60 days. 
The delivery date for the more delayed option in 
these choices ranged from 61 days to 180 days.
We then analyzed the data from each choice 
set separately, as described in experiment one. 
Choice data from the immediate-option set was 
again used to identify the point of stochastic 
indifference for each of six delays. Hyperbolic 
and exponential functions were fit to these indif-
ference points, and the functions we obtained 
were not statistically distinguishable from those 
observed in experiment one. The exact same 
analysis was then performed on the delayed-
option set. For this analysis of the delayed-
option set, we plotted the stochastic indifference 
points as a function of the interval between the 
two options in the choice set. On this graph, $20 
at a delay of two months would constitute the 
earliest possible time point and, as in the imme-
diate-option set, this option was assigned a dis-
counted utility of one. Perhaps surprisingly, we 
found that for each individual subject the hyper-
bolic function that stochastically fit the choice 
data from the immediate-option set also fit the 
choice data from the delayed-option set. The 
indifference curves of our subjects were just as 
hyperbolic when making choices at delays of 
two months as they were when making choices 
at no delay. This is a behavioral observation not 
predicted by existing multiple-selves models.
The preference data we gathered in this experi-
ment were thus similar to the preference data we 
gathered in experiment one, but we place some 
additional constraints on preference ordering. 
Specifically, the indifference curves were found 
to be functions not only of gain and delay but 
also of the time of the earliest possible gain in 
the choice set. In other words, our subjects were 
not simply impulsive, strongly preferring imme-
diate gains. Instead, they appeared to strongly 
prefer gains “as soon as possible” regardless of 
whether “as soon as possible” was a matter of 
minutes or months.
While this new observation may be useful, 
we can make an additional measurement with 
the brain scanner. We know that brain activity 
in the ventral striatum, the posterior cingulate 
cortex, and the anterior cingulate cortex shows 
a correlation (in fact a surprisingly linear cor-
relation) with discounted utility measured in 
the immediate-option choice set. We can ask 
whether activity in these areas is also corre-
lated with discounted utility as measured in the 
delayed-option choice set, and we can ask how 
activity during these two choice sets is related.
We therefore examined the brain activity of 
our subjects while they made these immediate 
and delayed choices. Recall that the brain scan-
ning data from experiment one revealed neural 
activation functions that were approximately 
linearly correlated (at the within-subject level), 
with the discounted utilities of the delayed 
rewards presented as options in that experiment. 
With these data we can predict the discounted 
utility of a delayed choice from that choice set 
using a neural measurement.
First, the brain scanning data indicate that 
the discounted utilities measured in the delayed-
option choice set are correlated approximately 
with brain activation in all of these areas. 
Second, the data show that overall activity for 
the delayed-option choice set is much lower 
than it is for the equally valued immediate-
option choice set. Empirically, we observed that 
the overall decrease in activity, the fractional 
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 rescaling of the neural activation function, 
roughly can be predicted by an exponential fit 
to the other neural activation function gathered 
during choices made about the immediate-
option set. The decline in activity observed for a 
two-month delayed option in the immediate set 
reflects a scaling factor that predicts, roughly, 
activity to the two-month delayed option in 
the delayed-option choice set. This may be an 
important mechanistic observation. Despite the 
fact that our subjects prefer gains “as soon as 
possible” regardless of when “as soon as possi-
ble” is, their striatal and cingulate brain activity 
is a decreasing monotonic function of the delay 
to the soonest possible reward. The following 
section briefly presents a model of neurobiologi-
cal computations that may be relevant to both 
the behavioral and neural data presented here.
III.  Model
Next, we present a two-stage stochastic model of 
neural activation that predicts muscle contraction. 
In the first stage of the model, for each option, stri-
atal activity (at a distinct anatomical location for 
each option) is a monotonic increasing function of 
value. For immediately available options, this is 
now a well-documented property of the striatum. 
The data presented here suggest that these activity 
levels are also a decreasing monotonic function of 
delay from the present to the time the option is 
realized. We write this neural activation function 
as Activation 5d1 1 t 2U1 1v 2 .
Our preexisting evidence suggests that these 
activations related to value are passed (indi-
rectly) to the parietal cortex. Within the pari-
etal cortex it is also known that, for available 
actions, the activity of computational elements 
(at distinct anatomical locations for each option) 
is a monotonic increasing function of the rela­
tive value of the striatal activity, in this case 
d1 1 t 2U1 1v 2 . The form of this rescaling opera-
tion has now been well described in other cor-
tical areas and is believed to take the form of 
[d1 (t, t) u1 (v)] divided by ovi, j [d1 (t, t) u1 (v)] 1 
c 0 , where d1 1 t,t 2  is the exponential decrease 
in activity (for option 1) as a function of the 
delay to reward and the neuronal discount rate; 
U1 1v 2  is the increasing monotone relationship 
between the value of option 1 and activity; vi, i 
is a weighting term that maximizes statistical 
independence in the activity of the compu-
tational elements (after Odelia Schwartz and 
Eero P. Simoncelli 2001); and C0 is a constant. 
This rescaling operation is then used as the inde-
pendent variable in a logit function that yields 
the probability that the muscles responsible for 
selecting option 1 are activated. For a binary 
choice in our task this would resolve to:
parietal activity 5 
 
3d1 1 t,t 2U1 1v 2 4
  v1, j 3di 1 t,t 2Ui 1v 2 4  1 v2, j 3d2 1 t,t 2U2 1v 2 4  1 C0
.
While the choice-theoretic implications of 
this identified neural algorithm are unclear, it 
is clear that these computations are being per-
formed by neural circuits without which choice 
does not occur. One striking feature of these 
computations for economists may be the obser-
vation that the activity of all computational 
elements is always influenced by the size and 
delivery time of the soonest possible reward, a 
reward that might be considered a temptation in 
a choice-theoretic setting.
IV.  Discussion
We employed both behavioral and neuro-
biological methods to examine intertemporal 
choice. Our goal was to use a revealed prefer-
ence approach to study choice and then to use 
the results of this revealed preference analysis as 
the starting point for a neurobiological analysis. 
While we did find behavioral evidence for hyper-
bolic or quasi-hyperbolic discounting, we found 
that our neurobiological data did not support the 
hypothesis that these discount functions are the 
product of multiple agents within the human 
brain.
It has been argued recently (Gul and 
Pesendorfer, 2006) that a choice-based theory 
cannot be falsified by the observation that the 
algorithmic structure of the human brain is 
incompatible with the computations required 
by that theory. This is undoubtedly true. Still, 
at a purely strategic level it seems imprudent to 
ignore any observable that may provide insight 
into choice behavior. On these grounds we 
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undertook a second experiment with two goals. 
First, we hoped to characterize more completely 
choice behavior under conditions of variable 
delay. The existing behavioral models (which 
we found incompatible with our neural mea-
surements) make clear predictions about choices 
among multiple delayed alternatives we hoped 
to test. Second, we wanted to examine further 
the neural evidence for models of internal con-
flict. The simplest neurobiological test for an 
“impetuous region” is to scan subjects making 
choices from sets that either do or do not include 
an immediate option (a point made to us by 
Loewenstein). An impetuous region should be 
active only in the immediate-option set—a dis-
tinction that should make the impetuous region 
easy to identify neurally.
At the behavioral level, we found that rather 
than being simply impulsive, as has been previ-
ously supposed, our choosers seemed to adopt an 
“as soon as possible” rule. The soonest possible 
gains were preferred at a more than exponential 
rate, regardless of when those soonest possible 
gains became available, and our neurobiological 
data again showed no evidence for an impetuous 
self. Finally, the relationship between a neural 
variable (activity in the ventral striatum, ante-
rior cingulate, and posterior cingulate) and dis-
counted utility, as measured in both choice sets, 
may impose some additional constraints on the 
representations of utility that future models can 
employ. Finally, the model we developed from 
our neurobiological observations can predict 
brain activity and muscle activations, and may 
raise interesting questions for economic study at 
the axiomatic level.
V.  Summary
A small group of scholars committed to the 
revealed preference approach have recently 
begun to propose that economics must search 
for additional observables that can be used 
to test and examine existing models. Andrew 
Caplin and Mark Dean (2007), for example, 
have proposed that the axiomatic reasoning that 
has characterized the study of revealed prefer-
ence can be extended to the study of neurobio-
logical variables that actually govern choice 
behavior. This seems to us an incredibly power-
ful new direction that could revolutionize both 
economics and neuroscience. Neurobiologists 
interested in the algorithmic structure of the 
brain have begun to reveal many of the proxi-
mal mechanisms by which choice is produced. 
Algorithmic mechanisms for preference order-
ing, stochastic choice, and even value construc-
tion have all been identified in recent years. 
Given these new observations, it seems only 
natural to ask whether these already existing 
observables can be used to examine, even fal-
sify, existing revealed preference-based theo-
ries of choice. At the moment, neuroeconomists 
seem to be dividing into two camps. The first 
of these camps has used neurobiological data 
to argue against a revealed preference analyses 
of choice (Colin Camerer, Loewenstein, and 
Drazen Prelec 2005). Here, we argue for a dif-
ferent road. We believe that the revealed prefer-
ence approach brings an unparalleled power to 
the study of choice. Contemporary neurobiology 
brings a similar power to the study of mecha-
nism. It is the combination of these two tried 
and tested approaches that we believe can revo-
lutionize both disciplines.
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